正文
Clemens Sialm
(University of Texas at Austin and NBER)
José Tessada
(Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)
We document a novel channel through which coordinated trading exerts externalities on financial markets. We study the impact of a financial advisory firm that recommends frequent reallocations between equity and bond funds to Chilean pension investors. The recommendations generate large and coordinated fund flows that are exacerbated by the strategic complementarity arising from fund trading restrictions. The recommendations generate significant price pressure and increased volatility in the stock market. In response to these large trade flows, pension funds shift their allocations to more liquid securities. Our findings suggest that giving retirement savers unconstrained reallocation opportunities can destabilize financial markets.
Family Descent as a Signal of Managerial Quality: Evidence from Mutual Funds
原刊和作者：
Review of Financial Studies
2018
年10月
Oleg Chuprinin
(University of New South Wales)
Denis Sosyura
(Arizona State University)
Using data from individual Census records on the wealth of managers' parents, we find that mutual fund managers from poor families outperform managers from rich families. We argue that managers born poor face higher entry barriers into asset management. Consistent with this view, managers born poor are promoted only if they outperform, while those born rich are more likely to be promoted for reasons unrelated to performance. Overall, we establish a first link between fund managers' family descent and their ability to create value.
The Investment Value of Fund Managers' Experience outside the Financial Sector
原刊和作者：
Review of Financial Studies
2018
年10月
Gjergji Cici
(University of Kansas)
Monika Gehde-Trapp
(University of Hohenheim and CFR, Cologne)
Marc-André Goricke
(University of Cologne and CFR, Cologne)
Alexander Kempf
(University of Cologne and CFR, Cologne)
Human capital acquired while working in other industries before joining fund management provides fund managers with an information advantage. Fund managers exploit this advantage by overweighting their experience industries and by picking outperforming stocks from these industries. These managers' superior information is impounded into stock prices slowly, suggesting that their information is unique and takes a while to be discovered by the markets. Families exploit their manager's industry-specific human capital by broadly employing their investment ideas in other funds. The investment value of industry experience is unaffected by whether or not the manager with such experience is in a team.
Decentralized Privatization and Change of Control Rights in China
