主讲人:
黄大康(西南财经大学助理教授)
主持老师:
(北大经院)吴泽南、石凡奇
(北大国发院)胡岠
参与老师:
(北大经院)胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇
(北大国发院)汪浩、胡岠、邢亦青
(北大光华)翁翕、刘烁
时间:
2023年12月14日(周四)
10:30-12:00
地点:
北京大学经济学院302会议室
主讲人简介:
Dakang Huang, who received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Toulouse School of Economics in 2023, is currently an Assistant Professor at the China Center for Behavioral Economics and Finance, School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. His main areas of research include contract theory, information economics, competitive markets, and mechanism design. His website is: https://www.dakang-huang.com/
摘要:
This paper adopts a unified perspective on multi-contracting in competitive markets plagued by adverse selection. We subsume the two polar cases of exclusive and nonexclusive competition by introducing the concept of a market structure, i.e., a trading rule that specifies the subset of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. The existing literature shows that the market structure matters greatly in shaping competitive allocations, allowing for either separating allocations (as shown by Rothschild-Stiglitz) or layered pooling (Jaynes-Hellwig-Glosten) allocations. We prove the existence of intermediate “Pooling + Separating” equilibria that allow for simultaneous pooling and low-risk buyer separation. Crucially, those allocations alleviate at the same time the concern of excessive rationing under separation of and cross-subsidies paid by low-risk buyers. They oftentimes Pareto dominate the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. Our analysis singles out the ``1+1" market structure where sellers are separated into two subgroups so that buyers can trade with at most one seller from each subgroup. Any “Pooling + Separating” allocation is an equilibrium here. Finally, we prove that “Pooling + Separating” allocations satisfy a notion of stability that we call serendipitous-aftermarket-proofness.